The inquiry into the Bondi attack is making the same mistake every bureaucratic post-mortem makes: it mistakes visibility for safety. Calls for "greater security" at Jewish events are not just reactionary; they are fundamentally flawed. We are witnessing a rush toward "fortress-building" that creates a false sense of comfort while actually increasing the risk profile of the very communities it claims to protect.
Most people see a guard at a door and feel safer. They shouldn't. In the security industry, we call this "security theater." It’s an expensive performance designed to soothe the public's anxiety without addressing the actual mechanics of a targeted or spontaneous attack. If the Bondi inquiry gets its way, we’ll see more high-vis vests and more metal detectors. And we will be less safe than we were before.
The High Cost of the Fortress Mentality
When you harden a target, you don't necessarily stop an attacker. You often just move the point of impact. This is the "Displacement Theory" in criminology, and it’s being ignored in the rush to look proactive.
By turning community centers and synagogues into fortresses, you create a bottleneck. You move the vulnerability from the inside of a building to the sidewalk where people queue up. A line of people waiting to clear a security checkpoint is a much softer, more concentrated target than a crowd dispersed inside a hall. We’ve seen this play out in transit hubs and airports globally. The "secure" zone starts at the metal detector, but the massacre happens in the check-in line.
More security doesn't mean more safety. It means more friction. And in a crisis, friction kills.
The Training Fallacy
The inquiry suggests more personnel. But what kind of personnel?
The private security industry is plagued by a "warm body" problem. Most firms compete on price, not proficiency. They hire low-wage workers, give them a day of orientation, put them in a uniform, and call them "security." These individuals are not trained in behavioral detection, de-escalation, or combat. They are glorified ushers.
- The Guard Reality Check: A guard earning minimum wage is not going to trade their life for yours.
- The Liability Gap: Private guards are often legally hamstrung. They can't search, they can't detain effectively, and they are terrified of being sued.
- The Observation Bias: Guards tend to look for people who look "suspicious" based on outdated stereotypes, missing the actual threats that blend into the environment.
I’ve seen organizations spend $500,000 a year on manned guarding only to have an auditor walk right past the front desk with a mock weapon. The inquiry is asking for more of this failure, just on a larger scale.
The Intelligence Gap
Security is 90% intelligence and 10% response. The Bondi inquiry is obsessing over the 10%.
Focusing on the physical presence at the door is a failure of imagination. By the time a threat arrives at the gate, your security has already failed. True protection for sensitive communities lies in digital threat monitoring, community awareness, and law enforcement integration—things that aren't as "visible" as a guard with a radio but are infinitely more effective.
We need to stop asking "How many guards do we need?" and start asking "How do we identify the threat before it leaves its house?"
The Jewish Community’s Unique Burden
Jewish organizations already spend an astronomical percentage of their operating budgets on security. It’s a "security tax" on being Jewish. Pushing for even higher standards without significant, permanent government funding is a death knell for smaller congregations.
If the government mandates a higher security "standard" based on this inquiry, many community hubs will simply go bankrupt trying to comply. You end up with a community that is "safe" but has no places left to gather. That isn't a victory; it's a slow-motion capitulation to the very forces of hate the security is meant to deter.
The Psychological Toll of Visible Security
There is a documented phenomenon where increased visible security actually increases fear. It’s a constant, visual reminder that you are under threat.
When you see armed guards and bollards every time you go to pray or drop your kids at school, your nervous system never leaves a state of high alert. This chronic stress erodes community cohesion. It makes the environment feel hostile rather than welcoming. We are inadvertently creating "ghettoized" mentalities where the community feels besieged, which is exactly what extremists want.
We are trading our psychological well-being for a marginal increase in physical defense that might not even work when the clock starts ticking.
A Better Way: The "Invisible" Model
If we actually want to protect people, we have to move away from the "bouncer" model.
- Behavioral Detection over Metal Detectors: Train staff and volunteers—not just guards—to recognize pre-attack indicators. An attacker’s body language changes when they are in "hunting" mode.
- Hardening the Infrastructure, Not the Entrance: Use ballistic glass and reinforced doors that don't look like a prison. You want the building to be a "hard target" without looking like one.
- Decentralized Response: Instead of two guards at the front door, you need a community where everyone knows the exit routes and the "run-hide-tell" protocols. Total reliance on a single person in a uniform is a single point of failure.
The inquiry is looking for a "Game-Changer" (to use a term I despise) in the form of more manpower. But manpower is a 20th-century solution to a 21st-century problem.
Stop Asking the Wrong Question
The public is asking: "How do we stop an attacker at the door?"
The inquiry is asking: "How many guards does it take to stop a knife?"
The right question is: "How do we build a community that is resilient enough to detect, survive, and recover from an attack without turning our lives into a permanent lockdown?"
If we follow the inquiry's lead, we will see a proliferation of low-quality, high-visibility security that drains budgets and provides zero real protection. We will have more cameras that only record our demise and more guards who are the first to be neutralized.
Stop building fences. Start building intelligence networks. Stop hiring uniforms. Start training people. Anything else is just theater, and the ticket price is far too high.
The next attacker isn't worried about the guard you hired last week. They are counting on that guard to be your only plan.
Don't give them that satisfaction.
